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DUE PROCESS IN AUTOMOBILE FORFEITURE PROCEEDINGS
Automobile forfeiture statutes authorize confiscation of motor
vehicles used to transport or conceal narcotics. The author
analyzes the constitutional infirmities of such laws. He evaluates
the applicability of procedural due process requirements to the
seizure and confiscation of motor vehicles in light of recent
cases and examines the trend towards increased protection for
innocent owners.
I. INTRODUCTION
State seizure of property used in the commission of an alleged crime
despite the innocence of its owner of any wrongdoing is a concept alien
to the American notion of justice. Yet the federal government' , Mary-
land 2 and most other states3 have statutes which authorize state or
federal officials to seize automobiles and other property involved in the
commission of a crime. The purpose of these forfeiture laws is to deter
crime by depriving criminals of the instrumentalities by which crimes
are committed.4 Prevalent among these statutes are provisions authoriz-
ing law enforcement officers to seize and confiscate automobiles used
in drug trafficking.
Formerly forfeiture was authorized despite the owner's lack of
involvement in any wrongdoing; but, because of the potential harshness
of the forfeiture laws, states now generally provide some form of
protection to innocent owners. The nature and extent of this protec-
tion are evolving concepts.
This note will analyze and evaluate the protection afforded innocent
owners both substantively and procedurally using Maryland's forfeiture
law as an example. After a brief review of the history of the forfeiture
concept, the provisions of the Maryland statute will be discussed. The
emphasis will be on procedural inequities of the forfeiture enforcement
in light of recent cases requiring notice and hearing prior to state
seizure of property.'
1. 49 U.S.C. § 782 (1970).
2. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (Supp. 1973). The statute is part of the Maryland version of
the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. Id. §§ 276-302 (Supp. 1973). The Maryland
forfeiture provision is similar, but not identical to the confiscation provision of the
uniform law. 9 U.L.A. § 505 (1973).
3. For a listing of states that have enacted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act see 9
U.L.A. 145 (1973).
4. Prince George's County v. One (1) 1969 Opel, 267 Md. 491, 497, 298 A.2d 168, 171 (1973);
Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 659-60, 284 A.2d 203, 207
(1971).
5. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE FORFEITURE CONCEPT
A. Common Law Deodand
Since forfeitures are an anachronism of the common law of
deodands, an understanding of the deodand concept helps to put into
perspective the current application of forfeiture. "A deodand ... was
any personal chattel whatever, animate or inanimate, which becoming
the immediate instrument by which the death of a human creature was
caused, was forfeited to the king ... ."' The concept was founded on
the legal fiction that an inanimate object was capable of doing wrong.7
Consistent with the fiction, the proceeding was against the object, not
against its owner.' The innocence or guilt of the owner was immate-
rial.9
At common law chattels were confiscated for superstitious rea-
sons.' 0 As late as the thirteenth century the deodand was received by
the deceased's kinfolk "not as compensation for the loss they had
suffered, but rather as an object upon which their vengeance must be
wreaked before the dead man will lie in peace. . . ."' I Later the
concept was modified to require sale of the property and distribution
of the proceeds for charitable purposes "for the appeasal of God's
wrath."' 2 The original purpose later became corrupted by the grant of
the property by the king to his favorites.' 3 In 1846 deodand was
abolished in England by statute.' ' It was never adopted in the United
6. Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 510, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (1916); cf. King v. United
States, 364 F.2d 235 (5th Cir. 1966). See also Sollenberger v. Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co.,
356 Mo. 138, 202 S.W.2d 25 (1947); 0. W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 7-9, 24-25 (1923)
[hereinafter cited as HOLMES]; 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
473-74 (2d ed. 1968). [hereinafter cited as POLLOCK & MAITLAND].
7. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 719 (1971); Prince
George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 658, 284 A.2d 203, 204 (1971). The
fiction extended to domesticated animals as well as inanimate objects. 2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND at 473.
8. Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931); Prince
George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655 658, 284 A.2d 203, 204 (1971); 2
POLLOCK & MAITLAND at 473-74. See United States v. One 1940 Packard Coupe, 36 F.
Supp. 788, 790 (D. Mass. 1941); Note, Forfeiture of Property Used in Illegal Acts, 38
NOTRE DAME LAWYER at 727 (1963).
9. "If a man fell from a tree, the tree was deodand. If he drowned in a well, the well was to be
filled up. It did not matter that the forfeited instrument belonged to an innocent person."
HOLMES at 24-25; 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 301 (1765) [hereinafter cited as
BLACKSTONE].
10. The origins of deodand are illustrated by the Mosaic Code: "When an ox gore a man or
woman and they die, he shall be stoned and his flesh shall not be eaten, but the owner of
the ox shall be quit." Exodus 21:28. See also 1 BLACKSTONE at 301; HOLMES at 24-25;
Note, 38 Notre DAME LAWYER at 727 (1963).
11. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND at 474.
12. Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 510, 188 S.W. 54. 55 (1916); 2 POLLOCK &
MAITLAND at 473.
13. Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 510, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (1916); 1 BLACKSTONE at
302.
14. 9 & 10 Vict., c. 62 (1846).
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States.' ' Nevertheless, modern forfeiture statutes have been said to be
"the direct descendants of this heritage. "' 6
B. Nature of the Forfeiture Concept
Forfeiture is the divestiture of specific property without compensa-
tion in consequence of some default or act forbidden by law.' ' It is
synonymous with confiscation' 8 and is generally distinguished from
penalty which relates to and is limited to a sum of money.' 9 The
theory of modern forfeiture statutes is no longer superstitious in nature
but rather to help suppress crimes by depriving criminals of property
used in their commission.2 0 Many cases have held that forfeitures are
not favored by the law and thus should be construed as not to work a
hardship.' '
Forfeiture actions, consistent with the deodand concept, are in
rem-the thing to be forfeited is the named respondent. 2  The for-
feiture hearing is an entirely separate proceeding which has no bearing
on any action taken against the owner for allegedly criminal conduct.2 3
The innocence of the owner remains immaterial absent some form of
statutory protection.2 4
15. Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 135 Tenn. 509, 510, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (1916); Sollenberger v.
Kansas City Pub. Serv. Co., 356 Mo. 138, 202 S.W.2d 25 (1947); 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND at
473-74. Another type of common law forfeiture that became antiquated was the
confiscation of all real and personal property of a convicted felon. However the proceeding
was in personam and forfeiture did not attach until the offender was convicted. R. C.
DONNELLY, J. GOLDSTEIN & R. D. SCHWARTZ, CRIMINAL LAW 495 (1963); 2 BLACKSTONE at
420-21.
16. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 720 (1971).
17. Kahn v. Janowski, 191 Md. 279, 60 A.2d 519 (1947).
18. Read v. Read, 9 Va. 160 (1840).
19. Kahn v. Janowski, 191 Md. 279, 60 A.2d 519 (1947).
20. The theory justifying forfeiture has been said to be:
[A Ill property is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall
not be injurious to the community, and an owner with knowledge or notice in the
premises cannot complain if loss ensues after the law works a forfeiture in the
suppression of an evil connected with the use thereof.
State ex rel. Woodbury County Anti-Saloon League v. McGraw, 191 Iowa 1090, 1095, 183
N.W. 593, 595 (1921). See also United States v. One 1949 Lincoln Coupe Auto, 93 F.
Supp. 666 (W.D. Mich. 1950).
21. Commercial Credit Corp. v. State, 258 Md. 192, 199, 265 A.2d 748, 752 (1970). See also
United States v. One 1936 Model Ford, 307 U.S. 219, 226 (1939); United States v.
Currency in the Total Amount of $2,223.40, 157 F. Supp. 300, 304 (N.D.N.Y. 1957);
United States v. One 1940 Plymouth Coupe Automobile, 43 F. Supp. 370, 373 (W.D. Ark.
1942); United States v. One 1939 Ford Pickup Truck, 35 F. Supp. 905, 907 (E.D.S.C.
1940).
22. Gatewood v. State, 268 Md. 349, 301 A.2d 498 (1973); State v. Greer, 263 Md. 692, 284
A.2d 233 (1971).
23. State v. Greer, 263 Md. 692, 284 A.2d 233 (1971). Since the procedure is civil, the State's
burden of proof is merely a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a
reasonable doubt. Prince George's County v. One (1) 1969 Opel, 267 Md. 491, 495, 298
A.2d 168, 170 (1973); Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 659-60,
284 A.2d 203, 205 (1971).
24. Lumar Sales, Inc. v. State, 268 Md. 355, 360, 301 A.2d 495, 497 (1973); Prince George's
County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 659, 284 A.2d 203, 205 (1971).
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Forfeiture proceedings are considered to be civil, although some
courts have said that the proceeding is quasi-criminal in nature.2 s The
proceedings would clearly be labeled criminal if an objective guide to
classification were used-whether their purpose is remedial (civil) or
punitive (criminal).2 6 For if the statute were truly remedial, the owner
could then show that the value of the property forfeited exceeds
reasonable compensation to society for the wrong done.2 However, at
least in Maryland, forfeiture statutes are still considered civil.2 8
C. Constitutional Inviolability
Several grounds have been unsuccessfully urged as requiring invalid-
ity of forfeiture statutes. The most frequently asserted constitutional
objection has been that the taking of property without compensation
from an innocent owner, often for the wrong of another, violates the
fifth or fourteenth amendments.2" Until recently, however, it was
considered well settled that forfeiture is a valid exercise of the police
power.3 0 Although some recent cases,3 ' which will be briefly discussed
in a later section, have questioned this principle, it remains viable.
Another constitutional objection to forfeiture statutes has been that
confiscation of property impairs the validity of contracts. The cases in
which this objection has been raised have dismissed it quite simply by
asserting the a priori principle that a contractual obligation is not
impaired by a statute that is in effect prior to the date of the con-
tract.3 2 A third constitutional claim has been that of double jeopardy.
Multiple proceedings in which first the person and then his property are
acted against make double jeopardy an appealing argument. Neverthe-
less, it has been repeatedly held that since the forfeiture proceeding is
25. In Re Food Conservation Act, 254 F. 893, 904 (N.D.N.Y. 1918): "I]he proceeding, in its
nature criminal, to take the property... is a proceeding not against the property alone,
but against the offender .... "
26. State v. One 1960 Mercury Station Wagon, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 1, 240 A.2d 99 (1968);
Commercial Credit Corp. v. State, 258 Md. 192, 265 A.2d 748 (1970); Commonwealth v.
One 1962 Chrysler Hardtop Sedan, 201 Pa. Super. 478, 193 A.2d 636 (1963).
27. Note, Search and Seizure in Forfeiture Proceedings for Liquor Law Violations: Common-
wealth v. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan, 69 DICK. L. REV. 284 (1965).
28. State v. Greer, 263 Md. 692, 284 A.2d 233 (1971); see cases cited note 23 supra.
29. The state, in the exercise of its constitutional power and in aid of the administration of
the criminal law, has long imposed responsibilities on owners and other persons having
interests in particular personal property "by ascribing to the property a certain
personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the wrong .... " J. W. Goldsmith,
Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 510 (1921). See also Van Oster v. Kansas,
272 U.S. 465 (1926). The rule that property may be forfeited irrespective of the innocence
of the owner has often been criticized as being too harsh, especially in regard to innocent
owners and lienholders. See Black, Some Prohibition Forfeiture Cases-The Doctrine of
Vicarious Liability, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 518 (1930); MacDonald, Automobile Forfeitures and
the Eighteenth Amendment, 10 TEX. L. REV. 140 (1932); Note, 38 NOTRE DAME LAWYER
727 (1963).
30. See United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715. 722 (1971).
31. See note 147 infra.
32. Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437, 446 (1903); United States v. One 1962
Ford Thunderbird, 232 F. Supp. 1019 (N.D. Ill. 1964).
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an entirely different case that has no relation to the action against the
offender, double jeopardy is inapplicable.3 '
A fourth objection, not constitutional in nature, has been that the
acquittal of the owner in the prior criminal proceeding is res judicata of
the forfeiture proceeding. The rejection of this claim, like that of the
double jeopardy argument, has been founded on the separate nature of
the criminal and forfeiture proceedings. Since the quantum of proof in
the civil forfeiture proceeding is a mere preponderance of the evidence,
while proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required in a criminal case, an
acquittal in the criminal proceeding does not necessarily mean that the
state could not meet its burden of proof in the subsequent forfeiture
proceeding.3
D. The Need to Protect and Define Innocent Owners
The harsh results possible under the forfeiture laws have resulted in
the recent recognition of the need to protect innocent owners. Surely
no one would deny that a statute which authorizes the state to seize
and forfeit property despite an owner's lack of involvement in criminal
activity works a harsh result. Confiscation of automobiles may deprive
their owners of their means of earning a livelihood, or seriously impair
the business activities of lienholders or rental car agencies. This result is
unnecessary as well as harsh when forfeiture does not serve its avowed
purpose of curtailing and discouraging drug traffic. The federal for-
feiture statutes are said to have the following purpose:
[I] t has been the experience of our enforcement officers that
the best way to strike at commercialized crime is through the
pocketbooks of the criminals who engage in it. By decreasing
33. United States v. Fields, 425 F.2d 883 (3d Cir. 1970). See also Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1137
(1953). In United States v. One 1951 Cadillac Coupe de Ville, 108 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa.
1952), the acquittal of the owner from a criminal charge of unlawful possession of
narcotics did not bar forfeiture proceedings against the car used to transport narcotics.
See also United States v. One 1953 Oldsmobile Sedan. 132 F. Supp. 14, 19 (W.D. Ark,
1955). Neither has it been held double jeopardy that the owner must stand trial in a
criminal prosecution after losing his property in a forfeiture action. Helvering v. Mitchell.
303 U.S. 391 (1938); Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577
(1931); United States v. One Machine for Corking Bottles, 267 F. 501 (W.D. Wash. 1920);
United States v. Manufacturing Apparatus, 240 F. 235 (D. Colo. 1916); Prince George's
County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 284 A.2d 203 (1971); State v. Greer. 263 Md.
692, 284 A.2d 233 (1971). Nevertheless at least one court has held that a forfeiture
proceeding brought subsequent to a conviction which arose out of the same transaction
constitutes double jeopardy. United States v. One Distillery, 43 F. 846 (S.D. Cal. 1890);
cf. McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739, 747 (6th Cir. 1971) (concurring opinion).
34. United States v. One Ford Coupe Automobile, 272 U.S. 321 (1926); The Palmyra, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 1 (1827); United States v. One 1937 Model Ford Coach, 57 F. Supp. 977
(W.D.S.C. 1944). However, one case has held that a prior acquittal of the owner of the
property subject to forfeiture would bar the subsequent proceeding. Coffey v. United
States, 116 U.S. 436 (1886). Coffey was cited with approval in United States v. One 1956
Ford Fairlane Tudor Sedan, 272 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1959). See also McKeehan v. United
States, 438 F.2d 739 (6th Cir. 1971). In Maryland the argument has been rejected. State
v. Greer, 263 Md. 692, 284 A.2d 233 (1971); Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co.,
263 Md. 655, 284 A.2d 203 (1971).
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the profits which make illicit activity of this type possiole,
crime, itself can also be decreased. Vessels, vehicles, and aircraft
may be termed "the operating tools" of dope peddlers, counter-
feiters, and gangsters. They represent tangible major capital
investments to criminals whose liquid assets, if any, are fre-
quently not accessible to the government.3 '
The definition of innocent owner should be related to the purpose of
forfeiture statutes. "When the forfeiture statutes are viewed in their
entirety, it is manifest that they are intended to impose a penalty only
upon those who are significantly involved in a criminal enterprise." 3"6
Consequently, as a general proposition, the definition of innocent
owner should encompass those who are not significantly involved in
such an enterprise.3 In spite of this basic proposition, there has been a
lack of harmony in delimiting who should be considered an innocent
owner. The protection to be afforded depends on the terms of the
statute. For example, the New York statute has been construed as not
affording protection to an owner acquitted of a narcotics possession
charge.3 On the other hand, Indiana makes the outcome of its for-
feiture proceedings dependent upon a prior conviction for narcotics
transportation.3 ' Other examples include: the North Carolina statute
has been interpreted as intended to protect any owner who is not the
person arrested as being "in charge of the vehicle at the time of the
arrest;" ' the Illinois statute exempts innocent owners if they are
"without wilful negligence" or "intention" to violate the law;4 1 Con-
necticut has adhered rigidly to the common law concept of deodand
and does not protect innocent owners.4 2
Despite the inconsistency in defining innocent owner, there has been
a definite trend toward expanding the protection afforded them. This
trend has been exemplified by changes in the California law. Prior to
1959, the California statute4 3 offered the following defenses to owners
in a proceeding to forfeit their vehicles: that the vehicle was not used to
transport narcotics and that narcotics were not unlawfully possessed by
the vehicle occupant, e.g., prescription drugs.4 4 By judicial decision
two additional defenses were added: that the owner did not consent to
35. H.R. REP. No. 1054, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1939). See also H.R. REP. No. 2751, 81st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1950).
36. United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 721 (1971).
37. Id. at 722.
38. Sachemaro v. Rosetti, 6 Misc. 2d 23, 161 N.Y.S.2d 454 (1957).
39. IND. STAT. ANN. tit. 10-3556(d) (Supp. 1973).
40. State v. O'Hora, 12 N.C. App. 250, 252-53, 182 S.E.2d 823, 825 (1971). See also State v.
Godette, 188 N.C. 497, 125 S.E. 24 (1924); cf. Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab
Co., 263 Md. 655, 284 A.2d 203 (1971).
41. One 1957 Chevrolet v. Division of Narcotic Control, 27 Ill. 2d 429, 189 N.E.2d 347 (1963);
Boling v. Division of Narcotic Control, 24 Ill. 2d 305, 181 N.E.2d 147 (1962); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch.38, § 36-2 (Supp. 1973).
42. State v. One 1960 Mercury Station Wagon, 5 Conn. Cir. Ct. 1, 240 A.2d 99 (1968); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-33(g) (Supp. 1973).
43. Law of May 4, 1963, ch. 253 § 13, [1933] Cal. Stat. 788.
44. People v. One 1962 Chevrolet Bel Air, 248 Cal. App. 2d 725, 56 Cal. Rptr. 878 (1967).
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the taking of the vehicle4 ' and that the lienholder had made a reason-
able investigation of the purchaser's character.4 6 The owner's lack of
knowledge of the illegal use was not a defense.4 " In 1959 California
amended its statute to require actual knowledge of a purchaser's in-
volvement with drug trafficking instead of a duty imposed to make a
reasonable investigation. 4 s But a lessor such as Hertz Rent-A-Car did
not fall under the provisions that protect lienholders because a lessor
was simply an owner who gave consent to another for the use of the
vehicle. 4 ' Finally, in 1967 the California legislature repealed its for-
feiture statute.' o
A further illustration of the trend toward providing protection to
innocent owners is the Uniform Controlled Substances Act (UCSA), a
recent addition to the regulation of narcotics, which has been adopted
by at least forty states within the last few years. ' Under its forfeiture
provision, conveyances used to transport illegal substances are forfeited.
As in the prior uniform law (the Uniform Narcotics Act" 2), common
carriers and vehicles unlawfully in the possession of another person are
expressly exempted from confiscation; l owever, the UCSA does
protect the owner from seizure and forfeiture due to offenses com-
mitted in his automobile "without his knowledge or consent."5 4
The most recent change in Maryland's forfeiture statute is consistent
with the trend toward liberalizing the definition of innocent owner.
The Maryland statute will be discussed in the next section.
III. PROTECTING INNOCENT OWNERS IN MARYLAND
Maryland, like most other states, has abandoned the historical
deodand concept and now provides specific statutory protection for
innocent owners. The nature and extent of that protection will be
discussed in this section.
A. Summary of the Maryland Statute
Although a more detailed analysis of the Maryland statute follows, a
45. People v. One 1957 Ford Two Door, 180 Cal. App. 2d 454, 4 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1960).
46. People v. One 1959 MG Sport Coupe, 182 Cal. App. 2d 448, 6 Cal. Rptr. 112 (1960).
47. People v. One 1964 Chevrolet Corvette Convertible, 274 Cal. App. 2d 720, 79 Cal. Rptr.
447 (1969); People v. Sabino, 215 Cal. App. 2d 149, 30 Cal. Rptr. 110 (1963).
48. Law of Sept. 18, 1959, ch. 2085, § 7, [1959] Cal. Stat. 4817; People v. One 1964 Chevrolet
Corvette Convertible, 274 Cal. App. 2d 720, 79 Cal. Rptr. 447 (1969).
49. People v. One 1959 Buick 2-Door Coupe, 187 Cal. App. 2d 684, 10 Cal. Rptr. 79 (1960).
50. Law of June 7, 1967, ch. 280, § 1[19671, Cal. Stat. 1437. Section 3 of the Act indicated two
reasons for repeal-abolition of the motor vehicle forfeiture provisions Was expected to
save the state $600,000 annually, and the provisions were said to have no deterrent effect
on illegal narcotics activity.
51. For a listing of states that have adopted the Uniform Controlled Substances Act see 9
U.L.A. 145 (1973).
52. Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 9B U.L.A. 409 (1966).
53. Uniform Controlled Substances Act, 9 U.L.A. § 505(a)(4)(i)-(ii) (1973.
54. Id. § 505(a)(4)(ii).
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brief overview of the forfeiture procedure will be helpful in putting the
statutory provisions in perspective. Maryland's current forfeiture
statute,5 ' enacted in 1972, authorizes forfeiture of motor vehicles used
to transport controlled dangerous substances.' 6 In determining
whether a motor vehicle should be seized and its forfeiture sought, law
enforcement officers are directed to follow certain standards.5 ' Subject
to these guidelines, an officer has broad discretion to seize motor
vehicles. Vehicles subject to forfeiture are to be seized upon process,
but seizure without process is authorized in four instances: when
seizure is incident to arrest; when the property has been ordered
forfeited in a judicial proceeding; when there is probable cause to
believe that the vehicle endangers health or safety; or when there is
probable cause to believe that the property has been used in violation
of the statute.5 " These exceptions, however, appear so broad that
seizure would be authorized in most circumstances without process.5 9
Once the vehicle has been seized it is deemed to remain in the custody
of the seizing officer pending further proceedings.6 0
Forfeiture of a seized vehicle is then recommended to the local
state's attorney in writing by the chief officer of the seizing agency
only after that officer has personally r'eviewed the circumstances of the
seizure and has determined that forfeiture is warranted.6 His discre-
tion in so determining is to be exercised in accordance with the
previously discussed guidelines.6 2
If forfeiture is recommended, the state's attorney must notify the
registered owner and any lienholders that a seizure has taken place and
that a petition for forfeiture will be filed.6 3 Two options follow: after
an independent review of the circumstances of the seizure, he may
return the vehicle, upon request of the owner if he determines that the
standards for forfeiture were not met; or6 4 he may petition the circuit
55. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (Supp. 1973).
56. Id. § 297(a)(4) (Supp. 1973).
57. Id. § 297(f) (Supp. 1973).
58. Id. § 297(b) (Supp. 1973).
59. Id. The section further provides that in the event seizure is based on one of the probable
cause exceptions, forfeiture proceedings are to be instituted promptly. In Geppi v. State,
270 Md. 239, 310 A.2d 768 (1973), the court held that forfeiture proceedings had not been
instituted promptly when the forfeiture petition had been filed more than eight months
after the criminal charges lodged against the owner had been stetted and the state offered
no explanation for the delay. The court ordered the property returned to its owner. On the
other hand, a forfeiture proceeding initiated after a delay of four months was instituted
promptly when the state offered a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Gatewood v.
State, 268 Md. 349, 301 A.2d 498 (1973). See also One 1972 Fiat v. State, No. 197 (Md. Ct.
App., filed Jan. 25, 1974). The current version of § 297, which was not in effect at the time
of the filing of forfeiture petitions in Geppi and Gatewood, requires that the forfeiture
hearing be held not more than 30 days after conviction of the acused. This section
potentially conflicts with the provision requiring prompt institution of forfeiture
proceedings since the criminal trial may not occur for a year or more.
60. Id. § 297(c) (Supp. 1973).
61. Id. § 297(f)(3) (Supp. 1973).
62. Id.
63. Id. § 297(g)-(h) (Supp. 1973).
64. Id. § 297(i) (Supp. 1973).
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court of proper jurisdiction to order forfeiture pursuant to a hearing.6"
Once the forfeiture proceeding is begun, the court obtains custody of
the vehicle.6 6 The hearing is scheduled to follow the criminal trial of
the violator in the usual case.6 ' If the accused is found guilty, the court
retains custody of the vehicle until the forfeiture hearing begins (no
later than 30 days after conviction).6 8 The owner may obtain posses-
sion of the vehicle before the forfeiture proceeding by posting a bond
in an amount equal to the appraised value of the vehicle plus antici-
pated court costs.6 9
The court may order forfeiture if it determines that the vehicle
was illegally used and that the owner knew or should have known that
it was to be used illegally. 7" The owner is permitted to answer the
forfeiture petition 7 ' and he may obtain release of the vehicle if he
establishes either that the vehicle was not unlawfully used or that he
neither knew nor should have known that the vehicle was to be so
used. 7 2 If the court enters a forfeiture order, the car is publicly
auctioned and the proceeds of the sale applied in the following order:
to the expenses of forfeiture and sale, to the balance due on any lien
and then to the state. 
7 3
B. The Protection Afforded Innocent Owners
Although the Maryland statute does not include an express definition
of the term "innocent owner," protection is afforded owners in three
different ways. First, vehicles of certain owners are expressly exempted
from forfeiture.7" Second, if the owner can show at the forfeiture
65. Id. § 297(j) (Supp. 1973).
66. Id. § 297(n) (Supp. 1973).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 297(n) (Supp. 1973).
70. Id. § 297(q) (Supp. 1973) (emphasis added) provides:
If after a full hearing the court decides that the vehicle was used in violation
of this subtitle or that the owner knew or should have known that the motor vehicle
was being, or was to be so used, the court shall order that the motor vehicle be
forfeited to the State.
Although the legislature used the word "or," it appears that they meant "and." The
preceding section authorizes the court to order release of the vehicle if the owner shows
that the vehicle was not unlawfully used or that he neither knew nor should have known of
the illegal use. Id. § 297(p) (Supp. 1973). The opportunity to show lack of knowledge
would be meaningless if the court could order forfeiture solely on a finding that the vehicle
had been used unlawfully.
71. Id. § 297(k)-(I) (Supp. 1973).
72. Id. § 297(p) (Supp. 1973).
73. Id. § 297(r)-(u) (Supp. 1973),
74. Id. § 297(a) (Supp. 1973) provides:
The following shall be subject to forfeiture and no property right shall exist in
them:
(4) All conveyances including aircraft, vehicles or vessels, which are used, or
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation,
sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of property described in (1) or (2), except
that,
(i) No conveyance used by any person as a common carrier or vehicle for hire in
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proceeding that he "neither knew nor should have known" that the
vehicle would be used in violation of state drug laws, he is entitled to
recover it.7 I Third, the statute provides guidelines to direct the discre-
tion of law enforcement officers in seizing vehicles and petitioning for
their forfeiture. 7 6
1. Exemptions
Policy grounds are the apparent reason for the exemption of some
vehicles from forfeiture. The first of the two exemptions protects
owners of common carriers and vehicles for hire.1 7 The apparent
purpose of this exemption is to protect those who hold their vehicles
out for public use, for example, buses, airplanes, cabs and rental
vehicles. These owners obviously are not able practicably to prevent
passengers from carrying controlled substances onto their vehicles and
thus need such protection. The exemption is subject to two restrictions.
First, the vehicle must be used "in the transaction of business as a
common carrier or vehicle for hire." It is not clear whether this
language requires that the vehicle be used merely occasionally or
primarily as a common carrier or vehicle for hire, or whether it must
have been so used at the time of the commission of the alleged offense.
No reported Maryland case has yet construed this language. Second, the
exemption does not apply if the "owner or other person in charge" of
the vehicle "was a consenting party or privy to a violation of" the
statute. This language has been applied in Prince George's County v.
Blue Bird Cab Co.,7 8 where a cab company leased a cab to its driver.
The driver was arrested for allegedly selling heroin from the cab and the
state's attorney petitioned for forfeiture. The owner contended that the
driver was not an "other person in charge."'7 9 Because he was behind in
his rental payments the driver's use of the cab was said to be unauthor-
ized. The testimony, however, showed that at the time of the driver's
arrest the owner had not considered the lease void and had not wanted
its cab back. The court considered this evidence sufficient to reject the
cab company's claim that the driver was not in charge of the vehicle.
The second exemption protects owners who can establish that the
act complained of was committed by another while the owner's vehicle
the transaction of business as a common carrier or vehicle for hire shall be seized or
forfeited under this subheading unless it appears that the owner or other person in
charge of the conveyance was a consenting party or privy to a violation of this
subheading; and
(ii) No conveyance shall be forfeited under the provisions of this section by
reason of any act or omission established by the owner thereof to have been
committed or omitted by any person other than such owner while such conveyance
was unlawfully in the possession of a person other than the owner in violation of the
criminal laws of the United States, or of any state ....
75. Id. § 297(p) (Supp. 1973).
76. Id. § 297(f) (Supp. 1973).
77. Id. § 297(a)(4)(i) (Supp. 1973).
78. Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 284 A.2d 203 (1971).
79. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(a)(4)(i) (Supp. 1973).
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was "unlawfully in the possession of a person other than the owner in
violation of" state or federal criminal laws." 0 This exemption protects
those whose cars are stolen and then used to transport drugs. It is
restricted by the requirement that the possession be in violation of the
criminal law. This restriction is illustrated by two Maryland cases. In
one case8 the vendor under a conditional sales contract resisted
forfeiture of the vehicle in which it had retained a security interest. The
automobile was said by the vendor to be unlawfully in possession of the
vendee because the vendee had used an alias in purchasing it.8 2 The
vendor claimed the alias was used to prevent the vendor from discover-
ing the purchaser's prior narcotics conviction, and, therefore, that the
buyer obtained the vehicle by a false pretence or by larceny by trick.
Although the court agreed that the conditional seller fell within the
definition of owner, there was insufficient evidence in the record to
determine whether the circumstances were sufficient to establish a
criminal possession of the vehicle; consequently, the case was remanded
for further proceedings. In the Blue Bird Cab Co. case the owner of the
cab also argued that the cab was unlawfully in possession of the
driver. 8 3 The driver's possession of heroin was claimed to be in viola-
tion of the lease and, therefore, unlawful. The court held, however, that
possession in violation of a lease provision, even though the lease
violation also constituted a crime, did not of itself violate the Maryland
criminal law. The court pointed out that the breach of a private
agreement did not create a criminal offense.
2. Lack of Knowledge
Prior to repeal and reenactment of the statute in 1972, the exemp-
tions from forfeiture were the only protection expressly afforded an
innocent owner. In 1972 the legislature added the new provisions which
allow an innocent owner to answer the forfeiture petition.8 4 If the
owner can establish that the vehicle was not used in violation of the
statute or that he "neither knew nor should have known that the motor
vehicle was being, or was to be" used in violation of the narcotics laws,
then the court may grant return of the vehicle.8 8 This provision is a
broad grant of protection and appears to engulf the statutory exemp-
tions previously discussed. It effectively ensures that lienholders and
rental car companies can recover vehicles in which they have an inter-
est. No reported decisions have construed or applied this section, but it
is apparent that it would have protected the owners in the cases
previously discussed8 6 had it been part of the statute at that time.
80. Id. § 297(a)(4)(ii) (Supp. 1973).
81. Lumar Sales, Inc., v. State, 268 Md. 355, 301 A.2d 495 (1973).
82. Id. at 360, 301 A.2d at 497.
83. Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 284 A.2d 203 (1971).
84. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(k)-(I) (Supp. 1973).
85. Id. § 297(p) (Supp. 1973).
86. Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 284 A.2d 203 (1971); Com-
mercial Credit Corp. v. State, 258 Md. 192, 265 A.2d 748 (1970).
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Although the statute does not expressly so provide, it has been held
that in a forfeiture proceeding the state has the burden of proving that
the seized vehicle was used in violation of the statute.8 ' Since the
proceeding is civil rather than criminal, the state's burden is simply
proof by a preponderance of the evidence rather than beyond a reason-
able doubt. An owner seeking recovery of his vehicle is required by the
state to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he neither knew
nor should have known that it would be.8 8 It has been argued that
placing the burden of proving that he is entitled to recover his vehicle
on an innocent owner violates due process. At least one court has
rejected this argument.8 9 The court said that exceptions or exemptions
from forfeiture statutes are not constitutionally mandated, but are
matters of legislative grace. The implication is that the legislature may
impose such conditions as it deems desirable on recovery of their
vehicles by innocent owners, including the requirement that the owner
affirmatively prove his innocence.
Another subsection provides that once the forfeiture petition is filed
the court "shall retain custody of the motor vehicle pending prosecu-
tion of the person accused and in case such person be found guilty, the
motor vehicle shall remain in the custody of the court until the hearing
on the forfeiture is held." '9 0 The statute is silent as to what happens to
the vehicle if the accused is found not guilty; however, the language
used implies that the vehicle will be released to its owner if the accused
is not convicted. This implication, however, is inconsistent with the
statutory provision on release by the court of seized vehicles at forfeit-
ure hearings. The court is authorized to order release only if the owner
proves that it was not used unlawfully or that he neither knew nor
should have known that it was or would be so used. 9 ' Acquittal of the
accused does not establish either proposition for two reasons: first, the
state's burden of proof in the criminal proceeding against the accused is
far more stringent than its burden in the civil action against the
property; further, the burden of establishing that the vehicle should be
released is on the owner, not the state.9 2
87. See Fell v. Armour, 355 F. Supp. 1319, 1330 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
88. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(p) (Supp. 1973).
89. Fell v. Armour, 355 F. Supp. 1319, 1331 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
90. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297 (n) (Supp. 1973).
91. Id. § 297(p) (Supp. 1973).
92. The forfeiture statute has been amended to protect some owners whose cars were ordered
forfeited under the prior statute. S.B. 271, Md. Gen. Ass., 1974 Sess., signed March 28,
1974 provides in part:
RIlf prior to July 1, 1972 and under section 297 of Article 27 as it then existed, a
court ordered a motor vehicle forfeited at a hearing prior to the owner's trial, and
the owner was subsequently acquitted, the court ordering the forfeiture, upon re-
quest by the owner, shall order the motor vehicle returned to him.
The bill does not indicate what remedy, if any, the court may apply if the vehicle has al-
ready been sold by the state. The following article appeared in the Baltimore Morning
Sun, March 28, 1974, at A-16, col. 1:
Governor Mandel today is scheduled to sign into law emergency legislation that
will return a yellow Opel sports car, once used "officially" by the Howard county




In order for an innocent owner to take advantage of the two
protections discussed previously-the two exemptions from seizure and
the knew or should have known standard-he must await a forfeiture
hearing. That hearing, the statute says, is to be scheduled after the trial
of the person accused.9" Thus it may not occur until a year or even
more after the seizure of the owner's vehicle. Consequently, some form
of protection was needed to preclude seizure of the vehicles of innocent
owners, or at least to provide for the prompt return of such vehicles. To
provide this protection the legislature has adopted standards to guide
officials in determining whether a vehicle should be seized, and, if it is
seized, whether it should be returned.9 4
Forfeiture statutes generally give state officials broad discretion to
proceed with seizure and forfeiture of a vehicle. The initial decision is
that of the seizing offficer. If the officer has determined that the
vehicle has been used unlawfully, he must then decide whether it
should be seized. Following seizure, the state's attorney or other
prosecutor must decide whether to remit the vehicle to its owner or to
petition for forfeiture.
Prior to the 1972 reenactment, the Maryland statute contained no
guidelines for the police or state's attorney to follow in exercising their
discretion. The statute was challenged in Prince George's County v. One
(1) 1969 Opel9 on the ground that the failure of the legislature to
provide such guidelines was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
authority. The situation involved a father who permitted his daughter
to use his car. The daughter allegedly sold methadone from it. A county
detective reported the alleged sale to the state's attorney, who peti-
tioned for its forfeiture. The chancellor agreed with the owner's chal-
lenge, held the statute under which the forfeiture was authorized
unconstitutional and ordered the vehicle remitted to the father. The
chancellor's order was reversed by the Court of Appeals on the ground
that the wide discretion vested in the state's attorney was necessary to
facilitate administration of the statute. 9 6 The court noted that the
exercise of discretion by the state's attorney in petitioning for for-
feiture was not subject to judicial review. 9 7
The governor at an earlier press conference had called the civil forfeiture of
Mrs. Keathley's 1970 auto to Richard J. Kinlein, the Howard county state's attor-
ney, -really a travesty of justice." Mr. Kinlein had operated the sports car, seized
in a 1972 marijuana possession case, for about a year, but returned it to the county
government saying publicity about the case was becoming a "hassle."
The sports car currently is parked in the Howard County Police Department
lot, "awaiting official notification to dispose of it," a police spokesman said yester-
day.
Mrs. Keathley... was acquitted in the drug case....
93. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(n) (Supp. 1973).
94. Id. § 297(f) (Supp. 1973).
95. 267 Md. 491, 298 A.2d 168 (1973).
96. Id. at 499-500, 298 A.2d at 172.
97. Id. at 498-99, 298 A.2d at 171-72.
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In the interim between the chancellor's decision and the reversal by
the Court of Appeals, the legislature reenacted the statute in what may
have been a legislative response to the trial court's decision. As previ-
ously discussed the new statute directs law enforcement officers to
follow certain guidelines in determining whether a vehicle should be
seized and forfeited.9  The guidelines are narrower than the "neither
knew nor should have known" standard. Under the guidelines a motor
vehicle is not to be seized and forfeited when:
The motor vehicle is being used by a member of the family
other than the registered owner and controlled dangerous sub-
stances or paraphernalia are located therein in a quantity in-
sufficient to suggest a sale is contemplated, and where no sale
was made or attempted, and the registered owner neither knew
nor should have known that such material was in the motor
vehicle ... . 9
98. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(f) (Supp. 1973) provides:
In exercising the authority to seize motor vehicles pursuant to this section the fol-
lowing standards shall be utilized:
(1) A motor vehicle used in violation of this section shall be seized and forfeiture
recommended to the State's attorney when:
(i) Controlled dangerous substances in any quantity are sold or attempted to be
sold in violation of this subtitle;
(ii) Although the violator has not sold or attempted to sell controlled dangerous
substances in violation of this subtitle, an amount of such substances or parapher-
nalia is located which would reasonably indicate that sale is contemplated by the
violator.
(iii) The total circumstances of the case dictate that seizure and forfeiture is
justified; these circumstances would include such factors as the following:
(a) The possession of controlled dangerous substances;
(b) An extensive criminal record of the violator:
(c) A previous conviction of the violator for a controlled dangerous substances
violation;
(d) Corroborated information is developed indicating that the violator is or
was recently a seller, or frequently associates with individuals known to be dis-
tributors of illegal controlled dangerous substances or paraphernalia;
(e) Circumstances of the arrest:
(f) The manner in which the vehicle was being used.
(2) A motor vehicle used in violation of this subtitle shall not be seized and for-
feiture shall not be recommended to the State's attorney when:
(i) The motor vehicle is being used by a member of the family other than the
registered owner and controlled dangerous substances or paraphernalia are located
therein in a quantity insufficient to suggest a sale is contemplated, and where no
sale was made or attempted, and the registered owner neither knew nor should
have known that such material was in the motor vehicle:
(ii) An innocent registered owner lends his motor vehicle to another and the lat-
ter or someone invited into the motor vehicle by such person causes controlled dan-
gerous substances or paraphernalia to be brought into the vehicle without the
knowledge of the owner.
(iii) The motor vehicle falls within the provisions of 297 (a) (4) (a) or (b).
99. Id. § 297(f)t2) (Supp. 1973). Prior to the enactment of the current statute the State's At-
torney of Prince George's County opened:
The owner must be totally innocent of any involvement whatsoever in the trafficing
(sic) in drugs, which means that we'll take a vehicle if the father has loaned his ve-
hicle to his son and his son is involved in the trafficing (sic) of drugs. A stranger to




It has been argued that these requirements are conjunctive and that all
three must be met or seizure and forfeiture will be proper.' 00 When
the section is read alone, that interpretation appears appropriate; but
the argument is plainly inconsistent with the section authorizing the
court to order release of a vehicle when its owner establishes that he
had no knowledge of the proposed unlawful use. Forfeiture at least
should be governed by the more specific provisions on ordering release.
The question then is when is seizure not appropriate. The apparent
legislative purpose in adopting the standards was to protect innocent
owners from the initial seizure of their vehicles. This purpose would be
better served by construing the section in the disjunctive to preclude
seizure when the owner had no knowledge, even though a sale was
made or attempted or a large quantity of drugs found.
Another problem is that the guidelines do not protect lienholders.
Lienholders are protected from forfeiture by the "neither knew nor
should have known" standard, and the initial seizure does not harm a
lienholder who does not have possession of the vehicle. But the stand-
ards do not provide for release of the vehicle to the lienholder after
seizure.' 0' Since the vehicle will be held in custody until after the trial
of the person accused, it may depreciate in value, substantially impair-
ing the lienholder's collateral, before its release at the forfeiture hear-
ing.
Nevertheless, the standards do offer some protection to innocent
owners. The extent of this protection will depend on how closely they
are followed. Of particular importance, therefore, is the question of
whether the standards are mandatory or merely directory. Although the
statute provides that "a motor vehicle used in violation of this subtitle
shall not be seized and forfeiture shall not be recommended to the
state's attorney when . . ., 2 the use of the term "shall" is not
controlling in determining whether the statute is mandatory or direc-
tory. The intention of the legislature is to be determined by considering
both the subject matter and the purposes sought to be achieved.' 01 In
this regard it is significant that the statute is silent as to the court's
Joint Record at 32, Prince George's County v. One (1) 1969 Opel, 267 Md. 491, 298 A.2d
168 (1973). Subsequent to the enactment of the current statute the State's Attorney of
Baltimore City averred through his designated assistant that he would be inclined to for-
teit vehicles only of those owners that should have known of the illegal transportation;
consequently, the vehicle of a father who lends it to his son without prior knowledge of the
unlawful use would not be confiscated. But an owner who has a history of involvement
in drug distribution would not be as generously treated. The Baltimore City State's At-
torneys' Office has a general understanding with lending institutions that cars in which
they hold security interests will be released to them on condition that they do not return
the car to the purchaser.
100. Brief for Appellee at 10, One 1972 Fiat v. State, No. 197 (Md. Ct. App., filed Jan. 25,
1974).
101. But see note 99 supra.
102. MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 297(0(2) (Supp. 1973).
103. Hitchens v. City of Cumberland, 215 Md. 315, 323, 138 A.2d 359, 362-63 (1958). See also
Barnes v. State ex rel. Pinkney, 236 Md. 564, 574, 204 A.2d 787, 792 (1964).
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power to review action taken pursuant to the guidelines. Further it has
previously been held that the state's attorney has unreviewable discre-
tion to petition for forfeiture.' 04 In the absence of an express grant of
power to the courts to review there appears to be no effective way of
enforcing the guidelines, and they should be considered to be merely
directory.' 0 5 Since the standards are merely directory, they do not
effectively limit the broad discretion granted to law enforcement offi-
cials to seize and to seek forfeiture of motor vehicles.
Much potential for abuse exists in the exercise of broad grants of
discretion. In the words of Mr. Justice Douglas:
Law has reached its finest moments when it has freed man
from the unlimited discretion of some ruler, some civil or
military official, some bureaucrat. Where discretion is absolute,
man has always suffered .... Absolute discretion is a ruthless
master. It is more destructive of freedom than any of man's
other inventions.' 06
The danger with respect to the forfeiture statute is that discretion will
104. Prince George's County v. One (1) 1969 Opel, 267 Md. 491, 298 A.2d 168 (1973); State v.
One 1967 Ford Mustang, 266 Md. 275, 292 A.2d 64 (1972). See also United States v.
Addison, 260 F.2d 908 (5th Cir. 1958); United States v. Andrade, 181 F.2d 42 (9th Cir.
1950); United States v. Hechinger, 163 F.2d 472 (2d Cir. 1947); People v. One 1953 Mer-
cury Four Door Sedan, 174 Cal. 2d 435, 344 P.2d 637 (1959); Kutner Buick, Inc. v.
Strelecki, 111 N.J. Super. 89, 267 A.2d 549 (1970); State v. Cherry, 387 S.W.2d 149 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1965).
105. Further supporting this conclusion are two principles of statutory construction. Proce-
dural requirements are generally considered to be directory. State v. Musgrove, 241 Md.
521, 217 A.2d 247 (1966); Myers v. State, 218 Md. 49, 145 A.2d 228 (1958), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 945; Snyder v. Cearfoss, 186 Md. 360, 46 A.2d 607 (1946). These guidelines are
arguably procedural. In addition, statutes which are given a liberal construction are also
generally construed to be directory. 2A A. SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 58.01
(Sands ed. 1973). The Maryland courts have consistently construed the forfeiture statute
liberally, consistent with its purpose and to avoid harsh results. State v. One 1967 Ford
Mustang, 266 Md. 275, 292 A.2d 66 (1972); Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co.,
263 Md. 655, 284 A.2d 203 (1971); Commercial Credit Corp. v. State, 258 Md. 192, 265
A.2d 748 (1970). Accord, Feitler v. United States, 34 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1929), affd, 281 U.S.
389 (1930); Jacob Oberson, Inc. v. Seyopp Corp., 251 App. Div. 170, 295 N.Y.S. 346
(1937); Dye v. McCanless, 185 Tenn. 18, 202 S.W.2d 657 (1947); Hemenway & Moser Co.
v. Funk, 100 Utah 72, 106 P.2d 779 (1940). Contra, Thomas v. State, 241 Ala. 381, 2 So.
2d 772 (1941); State v. One Ford Automobile, 151 Ark. 29, 235 S.W. 378 (1921); Brooks v.
Wynn, 209 Miss. 156, 46 So. 2d 97 (1950). Texas has a statute congenerous to that of
Maryland and has declared:
A consideration of the entire Act and the purposes sought to be achieved thereby
will not permit us to hold that the legislature intended the provision in question
to be mandatory, especially in the absence of words indicating a legislative intent
to do more than provide for 'the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of business.'
State v. Cherry, 387 S.W.2d 149, 153 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
106. United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. 98, 101 (1951) (dissenting opinion). See also A.
DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 202-03 (10th ed.
1961); Kadish & Kadish, On Justified Rule Departures by Officials, 59 CALIF. L. REV.
905 (1971). However it is noted that the great expansion of the police power role today is
necessitated by the problems of urbanization, industrialization and technology and there-
fore it is inevitable that substantial discretionary authority be delegated. Id. See also
K. C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE, A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 4 (1971).
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be used "to pay off a score, to provide a basis for extortion or to
[punish] an otherwise divergent or unpopular figure."' 0 " For example,
a vehicle which the legislature intended not be seized according to the
standards, might be seized despite them because the owner refused to
furnish information which might lead to persons involved in narcotics
trafficking. Similarly, the vehicle may be returned to an owner when he
furnishes the requested information.
What is needed then is some form of immediate judicial review,
preferably prior to seizure, to ensure compliance with the legislative
purpose to limit seizure to vehicles owned by those who are signifi-
cantly involved in drug trafficking. Some recent cases which indicate
that such a prior hearing is required will be discussed in the next
section.
IV. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
The Supreme Court decision in Fuen tes v. Shevin, 0 o ' if applicable to
the forfeiture concept, may offer further protection to innocent owners
by requiring the state to give the owner an opportunity to be heard
before his vehicle is seized. In Fuentes, state replevin statutes were held
unconstitutional because they allowed state officials, on application of
a private party, to seize the property of a debtor without affording the
debtor a prior opportunity to be heard. The challenged statutes auth-
orized a creditor to obtain a writ of replevin by filing a complaint
alleging that he was entitled to the property and by posting a bond in
an amount equal to at least double the value of the property to be
replevied. The writ of replevin ordered the state official to whom it was
directed to seize the property and to summons the defendant. The
official was required to hold the seized property for a three-day period.
During this period the debtor could reclaim it by posting his own bond.
If the debtor did not do so, the propoerty was transferred to the
creditor pending a hearing on the merits of the creditor's claim.
The majority opinion emphasized that the purpose of the prior
107. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTIONS 290-91 (1968). The diversionary
process by which offenders are channeled out of the criminal justice system (non-criminal
dispositions) is analogous to the way in which discretion may be exercised to focus on cer-
tain violators. See Brakel, Diversion from the Criminal Process: Informal Discretion,
Motivation, and Formalization, 48 DENVER L. J. 211 (1971).
If the prosecutor is obliged to choose his cases, it follows that he can choose his
defendants. Therein is the most dangerous power of the prosecutor: that he will
pick people that he thinks he should get, rather than pick cases that need to be
prosecuted... [L]aw enforcement becomes personal, and the real crime becomes
that of being unpopular with predominent or governing groups, being attached to
the wrong political views, or being personally obnoxious to or in the way of the
prosecutor himself.
Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 3, 5 (1940).
108. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). This case may be reconsidered by the Court in Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., No. 72-6160 (U.S., filed Feb. 5, 1973).
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hearing requirement is to protect against unfair or mistaken depriva-
tions of property.' 09 Consistent with this purpose, the Court insisted
that notice and an opportunity for a hearing "must be granted at the
time when the deprivation can still be prevented .... But no later
hearing and no damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary
taking has already occured."' ' 0 Neither the fact that the taking was
only temporary, nor that the debtor could immediately recover the
property by posting his own bond were sufficient to justify the stat-
ute.' ' ' Further, the requirement that the debtor post a bond to obtain
return of the property was itself said to be a taking.' 2
Although the Court held that a hearing was required prior to seizure
of the property, it was careful to point out that its holding did not
mean that property could not be taken prior to final judgment, but
only that the creditor must establish the probable validity of his claim
at a hearing prior to seizure.' ' 3 Moreover, the Court stated that a
pre-seizure hearing was not required in all cases-in a few extraordinary
situations notice and opportunity for a hearing could be postponed.' '4
Asserting that past Supreme Court decisions had allowed summary
seizure in only a few limited circumstances, the Court found three
factors common in such cases:
First, in each case, the seizure has been directly necessary to
secure an important governmental or general public interest.
Second, there has been a special need for very prompt action.
Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly of
legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a
government official responsible for determining, under the
standards of a narrowly drawn statute, ,that it was necessary in
the particular instance.' '
The Court gave the following examples of such extraordinary situa-
tions: "[TI hus the Court has allowed summary seizure of property to
collect the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a
national war effort, to protect against the economic disaster of a bank
failure, and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and contam-
inated food."' 16
Fuentes has had a major impact on multifarious statutes which
authorize prejudgment seizure of property. For example, its rationale
has been applied to prejudgment attachment statutes,"' landlord's
109. 407 U.S. at 81.
110. Id. at 81-82.
111. Id. at 84-85.
112. Id. at 85.
113. Id. at 96.
114. Id. at 90-93.
115. Id. at 91.
116. Id. at 91-92.
117. See, e.g., Richman v. Richman, 72 Misc. 2d 803, 339 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1973); Gunter v.
Merchants Warren Nat'l. Bank, 360 F. Supp 1085 (D. Me. 1973).
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summary distress procedures,' ' 8 innkeeper's liens' ' 9 and garagemen's
liens.' 20 It has had an impact on other areas as well: parole revoca-
tion,' 21 bankruptcy proceedings' 2 2 and deprivation of public util-
ities.' 23
In basic outline Maryland's forfeiture statute is very similar to the
state replevin statutes held unconstitutional in Fuentes. Property is
seized by state officers without prior notice or opportunity for a
hearing. After seizure the property is held by the state until a hearing
can be had on the merits. If in the interim the owner wants possession
of the property, he must post a bond in an amount equal to the value
of the vehicle. There is one signficant distinction-the seizure is not on
behalf of a private party but rather for the state. This distinction should
make no difference in the application of the Fuentes rationale because
in the past the prior hearing requirement has been applied to seizures
on behalf of the state.' 24
The constitutionality of the Maryland forfeiture statute will depend
on its compliance with the three factors the Fuentes Court found
common in prejudgment seizure statutes held constitutional. These
factors are cumulative-each must be met to justify prehearing sei-
zure.' ' ' The first of the requirements was that the seizure be "directly
necessary to secure an important governmental or general public inter-
est."' 2 6 Clearly, drug abuse is a serious problem in today's society, and
control of drug trafficking is in the public interest. The need to control
drug trafficking compares favorably with the need to protect the public
from misbranded drugs and contaminated food, needs which the Fuen-
tes Court found sufficient to justify prehearing seizure. It should be
equally clear that depriving drug traffickers of the means by which they
operate is a proper concern of law enforcement officials in reaching the
goal of controlling drug distribution.
But what is not so clear is whether prehearing seizure is necessary to
accomplish this goal. Phrased in terms of the second part of the Fuentes
test, the problem is whether "a special need for very prompt action"
exists. With regard to automobiles there is lacking the same inherent
118. ;ee, e.g., Shaffer v. Holbrook, 346 F. Supp. 762 (S.D.W. Va. 1972); Gross v. Fox, 349 F.
Supp. 1164 (E.D. Pa. 1972).
119. See, e.g., Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d 15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347
N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973).
120. See, e.g., Mason v. Garris, 360 F. Supp. 420 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Straley v. Gassaway Motor
Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973); Quebec v. Bud's Auto Service, 105 Cal. Rptr.
677 (Super. Ct. App. Dept. 1973).
121. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Stewart v. Jozwiak, 346 F. Supp. 1062 (E.D.
Wis. 1972).
122. Sandnes' Sons, Inc. v. United States, 462 F.2d 1388 (Ct. C1 1972).
123. See, e.g., Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1973); Pugh v.
Rainwater, 355 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1973), affd, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973); Bron-
son v. Consolidated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 350 F. Supp. 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
124. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S- 535 (1971).
125. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972); Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F. Supp. 574, 579 (D.
Md. 1973).
126. 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
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dangers that may be found with respect to misbranded drugs and
contaminated foods. Unlike those items, automobiles are not in them-
selves intrinsically harmful. Yet in some circumstances a need for
prompt action would exist.' 2' Notice to a criminal that his vehicle
may be seized after a hearing may defeat the purpose of the statute.
Presumably some owners would conceal the vehicle, remove it from the
state, sell it or otherwise dispose of it rather than risk its forfeiture. But
not all owners are likely to do so. For example, the owner in the Opel
case was the father of the person accused of the crime.' 2' Other
Maryland cases have involved the lessor of a cab' 29 and a secured
party.' 3 0 At least in these situations no need for prompt action exists
unless in a particular situation state officials have reason to believe that
the owner will conceal or dispose of the vehicle. But the statute is not
narrowly drawn to limit its application to these special situations.
The third test enunciated in Fuentes requires that the state maintain
"strict control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initi-
ating the seizure has been a government official responsible for deter-
mining, under the standards of a narrowly drawn statute, that [seizure]
was necessary in the particular instance."' '' The Maryland forfeiture
statute does require a state official to determine the need for seizure.
Further, the statute contains guidelines governing when seizure should
be made. In that sense it is narrowly drawn. However, the statute does
not require the official authorizing seizure to determine the need for
prehearing seizure,' 3'2 but only whether some general need for seizure
exists. Nor do the guidelines govern when prehearing seizure should
occur. Thus, although the Maryland statute meets the first of the three
Fuentes tests, it does not meet the last two-it is not narrowly drawn to
limit its use to extraordinary situations when summary seizure is
necessary, and no state official determines the need for summary
seizure. The conclusion follows that it is unconstitutional.
Only two reported decisions have considered the application of
Fuentes to automobile forfeiture statutes. In Fell v. Armour,' 3 3 a
three-judge federal district court rejected the contention that the
statute was unconstitutional because it failed to provide an opportunity
for a pre-seizure hearing. Relying on the "historically peculiar nature of
the law relevant to forfeitures,"' 3 the court felt that automobile
127. In some cases the owner would rather have his car impounded than left on the street
where vandalism, theft, or traffic hazards could result. If a car is impounded, however,
the owner could obtain return of his car upon demand since this is not the type of seizure
contemplated by the forfeiture statutes. Plitko v. State, 11 Md. App. 35, 272 A.2d 669
(1971); see Annot., 48 A.L.R.3d 537 (1973).
128. Prince George's County v. One (1) 1969 Opel, 267 Md. 491, 298 A.2d 168 (1973).
129. Prince George's County v. Blue Bird Cab Co., 263 Md. 655, 284 A.2d 203 (1971).
130. Lumar Sales, Inc. v. State, 268 Md. 355, 301 A.2d 495 (1973).
131. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 91 (1972).
132. The purpose of the required review by a state official is to determine the need for sum-
mary seizure. Id. at 93; Roscoe v. Butler, 367 F. Supp. 574, 579 (D. Md. 1973).
133. 355 F. Supp. 1319 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
134. Id. at 1326.
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seizure pursuant to forfeiture statutes was an extraordinary situation
justifying prehearing seizure. The court did not clearly explicate its
reasoning for this finding but appeared to be relying on the numerous
prior cases holding that forfeiture statutes were not subject to tradi-
tional due process requirements. The court said:
The Act, as interpreted by the Court, provides for forfeiture
upon use of property in violation of the Act. Upon the illegal
use the state is entitled to immediate possession of the property
and property rights of the owner are immediately divested,
though the seizure and physical deprivation may not occur until
later. The courts have consistently recognized that statutes may
provide for immediate forfeiture upon the illegal use of prop-
erty.' 3 5
Despite denying the prior hearing claim, the court held the statute
unconstitutional on three other procedural due process grounds: it did
not require the state to notify an owner that the vehicle had been
seized, it placed no burden on the state to prove that the seized vehicle
was used in violation of the statute, and it deprived indigent owners of
their right to be heard by imposing a $250 cost bond as a condition
precedent to the forfeiture hearing.' 36 The dissenting opinion,3'
although concurring in the result as to the other due process grounds,
disagreed with the view taken by the majority as to the applicability of
Fuentes. After noting that the basis of the majority's holding was the
traditional forfeiture doctrine that the chattel had committed the
wrong, the dissenter analyzed recent cases to show that this fiction "is
no longer intact and that, therefore, the Court is not precluded from
)51 3 8applying the due process clause to forfeiture hearings ....
In the other case a contrary opinion was expressed. In Pearson Yacht
Leasing Co. v. Massa,' ' the challenged forfeiture statute was held
unconstitutional by a three-judge district court because it allowed
taking of property from an innocent person for government use with-
out compensation. This holding was, of course, contrary to the earlier
precedent, but the court believed it followed from recent decisions,
which it interpreted as abandoning the legal fiction that an inanimate
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1335. The proposition that a hearing must be afforded immediately after the seizure
was considered in People v. Campbell, 39 Mich. App. 433, 198 N.W.2d 7 (1972), where an
owner complained that the failure to give him timely notice and a hearing immediately
upon seizure contravened procedural due process. The court agreed that the statute
could not be upheld, even though notice and a hearing were actually provided, because
the statute could not be interpreted as requiring such notice on its face. See also
Menkareli v. Bureau of Narcotics, 463 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1972) (where name and address of
owner are known, he should at least be given a copy of the proposed forfeiture), Jaekel v.
United States, 304 F. Supp. 993, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (oral notice of seizure and advice to
contact attorney did not give plaintiff sufficient notice of the forfeiture proceeding).
137. Fell v. Armour, 355 F. Supp. 1319, 1340 (M.D. Tenn. 1972).
138. Id. at 1343.
139. 363 F. Supp. 1337, (D.P.R. 1973), appeal granted sub nom. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., Doc. No. 73-157 (U.S., filed July 21, 1973).
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object could be guilty of wrongdoing.' 40 However, the court did not
stop there. It further held the statute was unconstitutional because it
did not provide for notice and opportunity for a hearing prior to
seizure. Forfeiture was found not to be an extraordinary situation
justifying postponing a hearing. The court said:
[T]he only argument advanced in defense of the prehearing
seizure is the "need" for efficient control of narcotics. How-
ever, we have not been shown in what way prehearing confisca-
tions are going to aid or make more efficient the enforcement
of criminal laws. It must be pointed out that the seizure of the
yacht took place on July 11, 1972, while the act for which it
was forfeited took place on May 6, 1972. Under such circum-
stances, there is no justification for not including in the statute
a provision that would require a hearing prior to seizure ....
[E]fficiency and economy do not justify obliterating proce-
dural due process .......
The Pearson Yacht case is now before the Supreme Court for
review." 42 The Court may avoid the question of the application of the
Fuentes doctrine to forfeitures by affirming the lower court's holding
that the Constitution requires the government to provide protection to
innocent owners.' "3 If the Court reaches the procedural due process
question, another line of cases may have an important bearing on the
outcome. In a recent case the Court has indicated an inclination to
abandon the concept that an inanimate object is capable of wrong-
doing, and, consequently, the result that an owner has no substantive
due process rights to be asserted. The case is United States v. United
States Coin & Currency,' 4 4 in which the Supreme Court questioned,
but did not decide the constitutionality of seizure of an innocent
person's property for the wrong of another. In that case the govern-
ment contended that an innocent owner was not protected by the
statute. The Court noted that the history of forfeiture laws supported
the government's contention; however, it questioned whether forfeiture
statutes which did not protect innocent owners were consistent with
the due process clause. The Court commented:
Even Blackstone, who is not known as a biting critic of the
140. Id. at 1341.
141. Id. at 1343.
142. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337 (D.P.R. 1973), appeal granted
sub nom. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., Doc. No. 73-157 (U.S., filed July
21, 1973).
143. Id. at 1342. The Court could conceivably avoid considerations of the constitutional claims
adjudicated below by relying on certain preliminary grounds urged on appeal: that the
lower court's declaration of the statutes' unconstitutionality was premature pending an
interpretation of the statute by the courts of Puerto Rico; or that any loss of appellee's
property was a result of failure to test possible remedies under Puerto Rican law which
might have been or might still be available.
144. 401 U.S. 715 (1971).
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English legal tradition, condemned the seizure of the property
of the innocent as based upon a "superstitution" inherited from
the "blind days" of feudalism. And this Court in the past has
recognized the difficulty of reconciling the broad scope of
traditional forfeiture doctrine with the requirements of the
Fifth Amendment.
1 4 S
The Court's comment was clearly dicta. Nevertheless, the case has been
cited as ending the fiction that inanimate objects are capable of wrong-
doing.' 46 Although the case holds no such thing, when read with other
recent cases,' '4 it does indicate a trend in that direction. This trend
supports the application of the Fuentes rationale to forfeitures. For if
the Court is willing to abandon the fiction that an inanimate object is
capable of wrongdoing, it follows that the forfeiture proceeding is
really against the owner and that the owner is more clearly entitled to
the protection afforded by a prior hearing. 1 4
It should be noted that even if the Supreme Court affirms the
holding in Pearson Yacht that the statute violates substantive due
process because it fails to protect innocent owners, the decision is
unlikely to affect the Maryland statute. In contrast to the Puerto Rican
statute, the Maryland statute does protect innocent owners by afford-
ing them an opportunity to show that they were not involved in drug
trafficking. Since innocent owners are protected, the due process clause
would appear to be satisfied substantively.
V. CONCLUSION
Modern forfeiture statutes have evolved from the ancient concept of
deodand. Today the basic fictions of that concept continue-the res,
not the owner, is the offender and the action is civil rather than
145. Id. at 720-21.
146. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. v. Massa, 363 F. Supp. 1337, 1341 (D.P.R. 1973), appeal
granted sub nor. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., Doc. No. 73-157 (U.S.,
filed July 21, 1973).
147. McKeehan v. United States, 438 F.2d 739, 745 (6th Cir. 1971): "[T]he imposition of for-
feiture on the Appellant is penal and causes an unconstitutional deprivation of property
'without just compensation.' " In DiGiacomo v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 1009, 1011
(D. Del. 1972) (citations omitted), the court observed:
Forfeitures, although said to be in the public policy, are a harsh and violent proce-
dure, at least until now sanctioning the seizure and sale of property without any
notice of, or the right to, a prior hearing.... Nevertheless, in my opinion, this ex-
ceptional procedure is beginning to run a collision course with a number of recent
Supreme Court cases and hopefully in the near future will be fully reexamined by
that court....
See also United States v. One Bally Sun Valley Pinball Machine, 340 F. Supp. 307 (W.D.
La. 1972); United States v. One Lot of 18 Firearms, 325 F. Supp. 1326, 1329-30 (D.N.H.
1971): "Requiring forfeiture.., would not only be unjust, but would also raise serious
questions of due process."
148. See Fell v. Armour, 355 F. Supp. 1319, 1341-43 (M.D. Tenn. 1972) (dissenting opinion).
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criminal in nature. But there is a trend toward abandonment of these
fictions. The harsh results possible under the forfeiture laws have
caused legislatures to make exception from forfeiture for innocent
owners. For example, the Maryland legislature has abandoned the
fiction in part by creating exceptions to seizure and forfeiture that,
consistent with the purpose of such laws, protect owners who are not
significantly involved in a criminal enterprise. Each new exception
whittles away at the fictions.
This trend away from the fictions has been furthered by recent
decisions which have questioned their continued vitality, or in some
cases forsaken them altogether. The probable application of the Fuen-
tes rationale to the forfeiture concept would create another significant
inconsistency with the historical origins of forfeiture.
It may be that the time has come to abandon the fiction altogether.
If the legislature believes that forfeiture of automobiles does limit drug
trafficking, and, therefore, that the concept should be continued, it
would seem more compatible with reality to recognize that forfeiture is
punitive in nature. If the forfeiture proceeding is recognized as being
criminal, then the state would have the burden of proving beyong a
reasonable doubt that the owner used the automobile in the commis-
sion of a crime. Thus, acquittal of the owner in the criminal proceeding
should operate as a dismissal of the forfeiture proceeding since both
proceedings are based on the same operative facts.' '
Mark N. Lipp
149. See United States v. One (1) 1969 Buick Riviera Automobile, 358 F. Supp. 358, 359 (S.D.
Fla. 1973).
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